

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL		X		
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO				
20	VC/NIC		X		
21	NIO/SP & NIO/USSR		X (2)		
22	C/ACIS		X		
SUSPENSE _____ Date					

Remarks

Executive Secretary

8 Apr

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United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 2, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

A potentially negative change in Executive Branch procedures for arms control verification is reportedly being proposed, and we are extremely concerned that these proposed changes could be dangerous to U.S. national security.

The principal problem in arms control verification in the past has been the CIA's ability to define "intelligence monitoring" in verification to be so broadly inclusive that CIA was able to dominate verification policy-making. It is authoritatively documented that CIA has a strong bias toward under-estimating Soviet strategic forces, and a strong bias against finding Soviet arms control treaty violations. There has also been a willingness among top policy-makers in the past to endlessly defer verification policy judgements because of ambiguities in the intelligence and in legal interpretations of arms control treaties. Policy preference for accommodation of the Soviet Union also played a negative role. The CIA tended to be subservient to policy officials who also did not want to conclude that Soviet violations had occurred and who did not want to enforce Soviet compliance. Dr. Henry Kissinger himself has conceded this, when he recently stated:

"There is no doubt that the Soviets have often barely observed the letter of agreements; in some cases, they clearly seem to have violated them ... Successive administrations have been reluctant to make a formal charge of violation lest they undermine domestic support for negotiation and because they did not know what to do about it." (The Washington Post, December 16, 1984)

Verification is clearly a policy problem, not a question to be dominated by bureaucrats haggling over intelligence or legal ambiguities. What is needed in verification is firm leadership at the policy level. We believe that neither the CIA nor the State Department should be allowed to seize control of verification policy. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is the only Executive Branch organization with the legal

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The President
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responsibility for verification. This means that ACDA should be responsible for leading on verification policy-making, and ACDA is charged with advising the Secretary of State, the NSC, and you yourself on verification.

It has just come to our attention that there is in fact already a proposal within the bureaucracy to negatively change the procedural and organization structure for arms control verification and compliance. Reportedly, two National Security Decision Memoranda, numbers 160 and 161, have already been issued on these proposed changes.

We believe that any proposed changes should first be discussed with Congress under the reporting requirements of Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the Derwinski Amendment.


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We

have high praises for a verification structure which, after 22 years of U.S. - Soviet arms control treaty-making and Soviet violations has finally produced three excellent Presidential Reports to Congress confirming 24 Soviet conclusive arms control treaty violations and 9 more probable Soviet violations. Accordingly, we request the complete details of proposed changes, including access to NSDM 160 and 161.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,



CC: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, CIA
Chairman, JCS
Director, ACDA